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Abstract 
Research examining how truth tellers’ and liars’ verbal behaviour is attenuated as a 
function of delay is largely absent from the literature, despite its important applied value. We 
examined this factor across two studies in which we examined the effects of a hypothetical 
delay (Experiment 1) or actual delay (Experiment 2) on liars’ accounts. In Experiment 1 – an 
insurance claim interview setting – claimants either genuinely experienced a (staged) loss of 
a tablet device (n=40), or pretended to have experienced the same loss (n=40). Truth tellers 
were interviewed either immediately after the loss (n=20) or three weeks after the loss 
(n=20), whereas liars had to either pretend the loss occurred either immediately prior (n=20) 
or 3-weeks prior (n=20) to the interview (i.e., hypothetical delay for liars). In Experiment 2 – 
a Human Intelligence gathering setting – sources had to either lie (n=50) or tell the truth 
(n=50) about a secret video they had seen concerning the placing of a spy device.  Half of the 
truth tellers and liars where interviewed immediately after watching the video (n=50), and 
half where interviewed three-weeks later (n=50) (i.e., real delay for liars). Across both 
experiments, truth tellers interviewed after a delay reported fewer details than truth tellers 
interviewed immediately after the to-be-remembered event. In both studies, liars failed to 
simulate this pattern of forgetting and reported similar amounts of detail when interviewed 
without or after a delay, demonstrating a stability bias in reporting.  
 
Key words: Lie-detection, forgetting, richness of detail, stability bias, verbal-strategies, 
verbal credibility cue  
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Public significance statement  
 
Across two studies we explored whether liars can take into account the tendency for 
information to be lost from honest individual’s memory over time (forgetting). Across both 
studies results were highly similar. Regardless whether liars incorporated a delay into their 
statements using their imagination (Study 1) or could use an actual experience (Study 2), they 
failed to feign the effects of forgetting.  
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A stability bias effect amongst deceivers 
In most deception experiments, truth tellers and liars are typically interviewed 
immediately after experiencing some target event (Vrij, 2008). In such contexts, truth tellers 
typically report statements richer in detail than liars (e.g. Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilarino, 
2016; Masip, Sporer, Garrido & Herrero, 2005; Oberlader, Naefgen, Koppehele-Gossel, 
Quinten, Banse, & Schmidt, 2016). Clearly, this may not reflect all applied settings as 
interviews can occur weeks after a critical event (Gabbert, Hope & Fisher, 2009). Whereas 
the memory literature predicts that truth tellers (retrieving information from memory) will 
forget details over time (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Ebbinghaus, 1885; Wixted & Ebbesen, 1997), 
it is unclear how such delays will alter liars’ verbal behaviour (Vrij, Leal, Granhag, Mann, 
Fisher, Hillman & Sperry 2009). Liars must take into account the effects of forgetting when 
being interviewed after a delay. If truth tellers forget detail but liars do not feign such 
forgetting, then lie detection may be more difficult after delays. Hence after delay interval, 
one of the most diagnostic credibility cues typically found in research utilising immediate 
interviewing paradigms (e.g. ‘richness of detail’; Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilarino, 2016; 
Vrij, 2005, 2008, 2015) may be undiagnostic.  
To advance the deception literature to examine the effect of delayed interviewing, the 
aim of the current two experiments was to examine how the verbal content of liars and truth 
tellers varies as a function of delay. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that liars commit a 
metacognitive error when lying across time (e.g. Lancaster, 2011; Vrij et al., 2009) and, as a 
result, display a stability bias (Kornell & Bjork, 2009; see Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer & Bar, 
2004): A failure to accurately calibrate their verbal output to take account of well-established 
patterns of forgetting over delay (e.g. Ebbinghaus, 1885; Wixted, 1990, 2004; Wixted & 
Carpenter, 2007).  
Lying about the past  
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 When lying about the past, individuals may generate scripts from their imagination 
(e.g. Vrij, 2008; see Johnson & Raye, 1998; Johnson, Foley, Suengas & Raye, 1988). On 
such occasions, the reported outright fabrication (e.g. a bold-faced-lie; McCornack, Morrison, 
Paik, Wisner & Zhu, 2014) will never have actually occurred and the fabricated account is 
not based upon a previous experience or recall (e.g. a fabricated loss of an insured object). If 
this fabricated event supposedly occurred weeks previous to an interview, liars face a 
challenge. As items in memory become less accessible over time (Anderson, 1983; Ayers & 
Reder, 1998), liars must attempt to calibrate their verbal output to match the level of detail 
typically expected of truth tellers. The loss of information from memory occurs rapidly at 
first before plateauing, a pattern known as the ‘forgetting curve’ (Ebbinghaus, 1885; see 
Murre & Dros, 2015), but estimating the appropriate degree of forgetting to simulate the 
actual recall of a truth teller is not an easy task for liars.  
Error in such a calibration may involve underestimation or overestimation of the 
appropriate level of detail to report. Theoretically, we argue that for two reasons liars may be 
particularly susceptible to overestimating the quantity of details to report after a delay. First, 
research shows individuals typically display a stability bias and underestimate the degree of 
forgetting across time (Kornell & Bjork, 2009; Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer & Bar, 2004). Thus, it 
is plausible that liars who fabricate an incident purported to have occurred weeks previous to 
an interview would display a stability bias by virtue of an inability to accurately estimate 
genuine recall after a delay. Second, unlike truth tellers who tend to take their credibility as 
self-evident (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998; Jordan & Hartwig, 2013), liars are 
motivated to convey an honest impression (e.g. Köhnken, 1989, 1996, 2004). To maximise 
their chance of being judged as credible, they typically strive to provide statements rich in 
detail (Hartwig et al., 2007; Nahari, Vrij et al., 2012; Masip & Herrero, 2013; Strömwall et 
al., 2006), as such detailed statements are more likely to be judged as credible (Bell & Loftus, 
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1989; Johnson, 2006; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Thus, liars may display a 
stability bias by virtue of being unwilling to reduce the detail contained within their 
statements after a delay to below a threshold considered necessary to appear genuine.  
For liars, accurately estimating the appropriate extent of forgetting after a delay 
requires metacognition generally (i.e. cognition regarding mental processes; Flavell, 1979) 
and the use of metamemory specifically (i.e. judgements and beliefs about memory; Kornell, 
Rhodes, Castel & Tauber, 2011). According to the dual view of metacognitive judgements 
derived from the Cue Utilization Approach (Koriat, 1997; Koriat et al., 2004; Kornell et al., 
2009), theory-based judgements can be distinguished from experience-based judgements. The 
former requires the explicit application of theory and belief (i.e. knowledge about memory 
decay across time), whist the latter utilizes processing of actual items in memory (i.e. strength 
and precision of genuine recollection). An outright simulation of a delay interval (i.e. in cases 
where the delay is feigned by liars) forces liars to utilize their beliefs and knowledge about 
the rate of forgetting across time. A practical example of this is any lie about past events that 
never occurred (i.e. there exists no past event to base the deception upon or embed the 
fabrication within). Correctly estimating the appropriate extent of memory decay to feign 
requires liars apply theory-based beliefs about memory. Thus, investigating how accurately 
liars employ their metacognitive knowledge is important for extending the deception 
literature to include lies told after delay intervals.   
In Experiment 1 truth tellers experienced an event and were interviewed about it 
immediately afterwards or with a three-week delay. Liars did not experience the event but 
were asked to pretend to have experienced it either just before, or three weeks before, the 
interview. In line with previous research (e.g. Amado et al., 2016; Vrij, 2005, 2008, 2015) we 
expect truth tellers to provide more detail than liars when interviewed immediately (i.e. 
without a delay interval). This difference in reported detail is attributed to liars’ lack of 
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imagination to tell a detailed, plausible, story (Köhnken, 1989, 1996, 2004) or to liars’ 
reluctancy to report lots of detail out of fear that any information they provide will give 
possible leads to investigators (Masip & Herrero, 2013; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014). 
Individual’s beliefs regarding memory’s permanence are frequently incorrect (Magnussen et 
al., 2006; Ost et al., 2016). The performance of memory across time is often overestimated 
(Legaut & Laurence, 2007; Loftus & Loftus, 1980; Simons & Chabris, 2011). Plausibly, liars 
may miscalibrate the appropriate quantity of detail to provide after a simulated delay interval 
and thus commit a metacognitive error (Vrij et al., 2009).  
Based upon the previous theoretical considerations, we predict that liars will display a 
stability bias (Koriat et al., 2004; Kornell et al., 2009). We predict that the amount of detail 
reported by liars will not vary as a function of delay interval, compared to truth tellers who 
will display forgetting across delay interval (Hypothesis 1). If the quantity of detail reported 
by truth teller’s decreases (due to forgetting) across delay, and the quantity of detail reported 
by liars remains constant (due to a stability bias; Hypothesis 1), it can be predicted that the 
difference in reported detail between truth tellers and liars will be more pronounced in the 
immediate condition than in the delay interval condition. We predict deception detection 
accuracy to be greater in the immediate interviewing condition compared to the delay interval 
condition (Hypothesis 2).   
Experiment 1 
Method 
Design  
 A 2 (Veracity: Truth teller vs. Liar) x 2 (Interview Time: Immediate vs. Delay) between 
subject design was used with the quantity of details provided as the dependent measure.    
Ethics   
Running head: A stability bias effect amongst deceivers  
 
 
8 
8 
 A favorable ethical review decision was given, prior to the research, by the Science 
Faculty Ethics Committee (SFEC) (reference SFEC 2014-082), University of Portsmouth, 
UK.  All participants’ rights where protected during the study.   
 
Participants  
 A total of 80 volunteers (52 females), aged between 18 and 41 years (M = 21.26 years, 
SD = 3.89, 95% CI [20.39, 22.15]), from the University’s undergraduate, postgraduate, and 
staff, communities, participated in the experiment.   
Procedure  
 Participants were recruited via adverts on the University’s online participant pool. 
Individuals arrived at the laboratory at pre-arranged times and were informed that the 
experiment was about detecting deception within an insurance setting. Each participant was 
given an information sheet about the study and informed written consent was obtained.  
 Upon obtaining informed consent, all participants were randomly allocated to either the 
truth teller (n = 40) or liar (n = 40) Veracity conditions. Half of the liars and half of the truth 
tellers where then randomly allocated to either the delay (n = 40) or the immediate (n = 40) 
Interviewing Condition, resulting in 20 participants per cell.   
 Both liars and truth tellers were told that the study involved lie detection in an 
insurance claim setting. Truth tellers (n=40) were informed that the first phase of the study 
(Phase 1) would take place at a local bar, approximately 200 meters from the department. 
Truth tellers were informed that they may experience a staged ‘loss’ (i.e. theft) of a tablet 
device from this location and that they would be asked to honestly report during an interview 
what they could recall about the incident. In contrast, liars (n=40) where informed their task 
was to pretend they were truth tellers and to convince an interviewer they experienced the 
loss of the tablet at a local bar (i.e. that they had experienced the truth teller’s scenario). As 
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the truth tellers task was scripted and staged with confederates, liars where provided a 
description of this scenario.   
 Truth tellers, accompanied by the experimenter, collected a tablet device from the 
technology support office. Participants were then escorted to the local bar where they were 
intercepted by a confederate posing as a PhD student. The PhD student explained that he 
required assistance from the researcher regarding a manuscript. The experimenter explained 
that he was running a study but suggested that the confederate join him and the participant at 
the bar. No participant objected. Once inside, the participant, experimenter and confederate 
sat in a pre-determined location from which it was not possible to see the bar area. The 
participant was handed the tablet device and instructed to open an app (for the study). 
Deliberately, the tablet device was not charged and so the participant found that they were 
not able to open the app due to low battery levels. The experimenter then suggested taking it 
to the bar and asking the bar staff if it could be charged. The participant always accompanied 
the experimenter to the bar and witnessed the bar staff (also confederates) accepting the 
device and taking it out of sight (into a staff room) to be ‘charged’. In reality, the device was 
placed in a satchel for later collection. Taking some drinks back to the table, the experimenter 
then read the confederate’s manuscript, whist the participant and confederate played three 
rounds of a popular game (ConnectFour). After 15 minutes, the participant and experimenter 
returned to collect the device to be told it had already been taken by someone the staff 
assumed was a member of the research team. The confederate and participant were asked if 
they had seen anything (nobody reported seeing anything which is unsurprising as they could 
not have seen anything given the position of the table in relation to the bar). The 
experimenter then said that they should return to the department to explain what happened.  
 Truthful participants in the delay condition were told that they had completed the first 
phase of the study. Contact details were taken and dates and times were confirmed for these 
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participants to return three-weeks later. On their return after three weeks, participants in the 
delay condition progressed to Phase 2 of the experiment.  
 Truthful participants in the immediate condition progressed immediately to Phase 2 of 
the experiment.  At the outset, all truth tellers were told they would be interviewed about the 
loss of the department’s tablet device. Before the interview, truth tellers were reminded they 
should be totally truthful to the interviewer and provide them with as much information about 
the incident as they can recall.  
 The task for liars was necessarily different to that of truth tellers.  Liars did not go to 
the bar with the experimenter.  Instead all liars were provided a description of the truth 
teller’s scenario, including photos of the experimenter, the confederate from the bar and the 
tablet device, together with a map indicating their route (see Appendix 1). Liars were told 
they were free to report any information they deemed necessary to convince the interviewer 
they were telling the truth. Furthermore, liars were instructed that their task was to convince 
an interviewer (who did not know if they were lying or telling the truth) they were truth 
tellers and had actually experienced the loss of the tablet device. As such, liars had to pretend 
to have suffered a loss they never actually experienced.  
 Half the liars were informed it was critical they pretended the incident occurred 
immediately before being interviewed. This was justified by explaining that truth tellers had 
also experienced the loss immediately prior to the interview. The other half the liars (n=20) 
were informed it was critical they pretended the incident occurred three weeks prior to the 
interview. They were informed that this was because truth tellers had experienced the loss 
three weeks prior to the interview. 
 All participants (liars and truth tellers) were told that if the interviewer judged them as 
truthful, they would receive £5. In addition, participants who were rated as truthful by the 
interviewer would be entered into a prize draw to win up to £150 in prize money. However, if 
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participants where judged to be untruthful, they would instead be asked to write a statement 
about what happened during the study. In reality, in addition to the standard compensation 
(£5), all participants (irrespective of condition or performance in the interview) were entered 
into the prize draw and none were required to write a statement.  Three winners of the prize 
draw were randomly selected and awarded £150, £75 and £50. 
 All participants where offered as much preparation time as they required prior to the 
interview. Liars in the ‘immediate’ condition where reminded they should deceive the 
interviewer and pretend the incident occurred immediately prior to the interview, whereas 
liars in the ‘delay’ condition where reminded they should deceive the interviewer and pretend 
the incident occurred three-weeks prior to the interview. As such, liars provided their 
statement immediately after reading the experimental materials and exercising their option of 
preparation time. After indicating they were prepared for the interview, all participants 
completed the pre-interview questionnaire. The participants were asked for their demographic 
information (age, gender, occupation) and to rate their preparation for the interview (on 7-
point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (very poor) to 7 (very good). Participants were 
interviewed on completion of the questionnaire.   
The interview  
 At the outset of each interview, the interviewer explained that s/he understood that the 
department’s tablet was lost either immediately before the interview (truth tellers and liars in 
the immediate condition) or three weeks prior to the interview (truth tellers and liars in the 
delay condition). The question protocol was identical for all interviews and comprised of a 
single free recall instruction. Participants were asked to report, in as much detail as possible, 
everything that happened from the moment they initially left the laboratory to the moment 
they realised the tablet device was missing.  All interviews were audiotaped and the 
interviewer was blind to the veracity of the interviewees. After the interview, participants 
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were given a post-interview questionnaire to complete. In this questionnaire, participants 
were asked to report their motivation for performing well during the interview (on an 7-point 
Likert Scale, ranging from 1 extremely unmotivated to 7 extremely motivated), and to report 
percentage of truthful information they disclosed in the interview (also on an 11-point Likert 
Scale, ranging from 0% to 100%). Truth tellers were asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert 
scale (whereby 1 denotes ‘not at all’ and 7 denotes ‘to a great extent’) how strong, precise 
and detailed their memory of the incident was. Liars where asked to indicate on a 7-point 
Likert scale (whereby 1 denotes ‘not at all’ and 7 denotes ‘to a great extent’) how strong, 
precise and detailed they pretended their memory of the incident to be during the interview. 
Upon completion participants where thanked, debriefed and compensated for their time. 
Coding  
 All audiotaped interviews were transcribed and the coding was conducted using these 
transcripts. The statements were coded by one coder (blind to the experimental conditions). A 
frequency count method was employed rather than a response scale method (see Nahari, 2016 
for alternative content analysis scoring methodology). For clarity we have provided 
underlined examples of the coded details. The coder scored perceptual detail (information 
about what was seen, heard, felt and smelt during the described activities, e.g. ‘she spoke 
quietly’), spatial detail (information about locations or the arrangement of persons and/or 
objects; e.g. ‘he sat next to her, to the left’) and temporal detail (information about when the 
event happened and explicit descriptions of the sequence of various events; e.g. ‘first he 
ordered a drink and then read her paper’). Information about objects (e.g. ‘we sat down at a 
table’) and actions (e.g. ‘the waitress walked over to us’) were coded and classified as 
examples of perceptual information. The coder was experienced and has coded verbal detail 
in several previous experiments carried out in this lab.   
 A second coder (also blind to the veracity of the statements and trained as a coder) 
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coded a random selection of 16 statements (20%) for all the dependent measures. Inter-rater 
reliabilities between the two coders for the occurrence frequency of perceptual, spatial and 
temporal detail were measured via intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC). The ICC was 
high and therefore satisfactory for total spatial details [ICC] = .81, temporal details [ICC] = 
.84, perceptual details [ICC] = .79 and total details (spatial, temporal and perceptual 
information combined, ICC = .80]. The three sub-categories of detail were introduced to 
facilitate (inter-rater) reliability coding and to explore whether, for example, one type of 
detail is more sensitive to decay than another type of detail. As no hypotheses were 
formulated pertaining to different detail types, we only report the total number of details 
reported in the Results section (see supplementary material for additional analyses).  
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 Veracity  
 Truthful participants rated their statements as being overwhelmingly based on a truthful 
experience, rating the majority of their statement as truthful (M = 89.25%, SD = 14.21, 95% 
CI [85.00, 93.57]), whereas deceptive participants rated their statement to be overwhelmingly 
based on fabrication (M = 13.50%, SD = 13.50, 95% CI [9.29, 18.12]), t(78) = 24.44 p < 
0.001, d= 5.47, 95% CI[4.47, 6.36].  
 Delay  
 Truth tellers in the delay condition rated their memories of the critical incident as 
weaker, less clear and less detailed to a greater extent than truth tellers in the immediate 
condition, all t’s > 5.31, all p’s <0.001, Cohen’s d > 1.68. Liars in the delay condition rated 
pretending to have weaker, more-vague and less detailed memories of the critical incident to 
a greater extent than liars in the immediate condition, all t’s > 2.89, all p’s < 0.006, all d > 
0.93, see Table 1.  
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Motivation  
 Overall, participants reported being highly motivated (M = 6.11, SD = 0.71, 95% CI 
[5.95, 6.26]) to perform well in the experiment. No main effect for Veracity, F(1,76)= .025, 
p= .876 or Interview Time F(1,76)= .614, p=.436 emerged, and the Veracity X Interview 
Time interaction was not significant either, F(1,76) = 1.991, p= .162. 
Reported Detail 
 A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interview Time) analysis of variance (ANOVA) using overall 
reported detail as the dependent variable, revealed a main effect for Veracity, F(1,76)= 9.43, 
MSE = 16936.20, p = 0.003. A significant main effect for Interview Time also emerged, 
F(1,76)= 5.124, MSE = 9202.05, p = 0.026. Furthermore, the Interview Time X Veracity 
interaction was significant, F(1,76) = 11.981, MSE = 21516.80, p = 0.001, ηp2
 = .14.   
 Truth tellers in the Immediate condition (M = 138.55, SD = 55.05, 95% CI [116.09, 
164.35]) reported more details than truth tellers in the Delay condition (M = 84.30, SD = 
40.95, 95% CI [67.53, 102.53]), t(38) = 3.536,  p = 0.001, d = 1.12, 95% CI [.63, 1.57]. In 
contrast, liars in the immediate condition (M = 76.65, SD = 33.06, 95% CI [62.88, 91.04]) 
and liars in the Delay condition (M = 88.00, SD = 37.20, 95% CI [72.55, 104.72]) did not 
differ significantly in terms of the number of details reported, t(38) = 1.020,  p= 0.314, d = 
.32, 95% CI [-.12, 0.76].  This interaction effect supports Hypothesis 1. 
Classification  
 We ran two discriminate analyses to distinguish between truthful and deceptive 
participants in the i) Immediate and ii) Delay interview conditions separately. In both cases, 
the objective Veracity group belonging (truth teller or liar) was the classifying variable and 
overall reported detail was the predictor. We present the cross-validated ‘leave-one-out’ 
results. A significant discriminant function emerged for distinguishing between Truth Tellers 
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and Liars in the Immediate interviewing condition, χ2(1) = 14.930, Wilks’ λ = 0.672, p < 
0.001, (canonical correlation was .57). This function correctly classified 80.0% of liars and 
65.0% of truth tellers, resulting in an overall accuracy rate of 72.5%; see Table 2. The 
discriminate analysis distinguishing between Liars and Truth Tellers in the delay condition 
was not significant, χ2(1) = 0.088, Wilks’ λ = 0.999, p = 0.998 (canonical correlation was 
0.05). These findings support Hypothesis 2. 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
Discussion 
The quantity of details reported by liars did not vary as a function of interview time. 
Liars failed to accurately calibrate the quantity of disclosed detail to simulate the effect of 
forgetting across time associated with genuine memory. The observed insensitive to the delay 
manipulation displayed by liars suggests a stability bias affecting their verbal behaviour. 
Truth tellers reported more detail in the immediate interview condition versus the delay 
interview condition suggesting forgetting over time. The difference between liars and truth 
tellers in terms of detail quantity was greater in the immediate (versus delay) condition. 
Superior lie detection accuracy was possible in the immediate (versus the delay) interviewing 
condition (see Table 3). These results support both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.  
 Experiment 1 forced liars to produce fabrications using their imagination (rather than 
perceptual experience). Indeed, liars reported very little (13.50%) of the information they 
disclosed as being derived from actual experience. This implies, however, that liars in our 
experimental scenario were forced to incorporate the effect of delay theoretically (via 
applying specific meta-memorial knowledge about forgetting over time).  
 Such a hypothetical delay may not reflect all settings. Liars typically prefer to tell 
‘embedded’ lies (Leins, Fisher & Ross, 2013; Vrij, 2008). In such instances, liars produce 
fabrications using genuine memory from past experience, rather than from imagination (for 
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an analogous theoretical argument, see McCornack et al., 2014). For example, an individual 
might lie about what was said at an actual meeting. Here liars will have a genuine memory of 
the meeting, rather than relying on an outright fabricated script (i.e. McCornack, 1992, 
McCornack et al. 2014). As such, a deception about past events can manipulate information 
retrieved from memory. 
One possibility is that lying about real past events (i.e. telling embedded lies; Leins et 
al., 2013; Vrij, 2008) will result in a shift in liars from analytic utilization of theory-based 
cues (i.e. knowledge about forgetting over time) to experienced-based cues (i.e. using the 
strength of genuine recollection) as a means for calibrating how much information to report 
after a delay (Koriat, 1997; Koriat et al., 2004; Kornell et al., 2009). This may lead liars to 
more accurately calibrate the level of detail to report after a delay interval as genuine memory 
will have (plausibly) decayed. However, calibration may still not be so easy for liars. 
Individuals typically display poor accuracy when estimating their own learning and others 
future memory performance when judgements are made in a between-subject manner (i.e. 
when an individual makes a single estimate regarding future memory performance; Koriat et 
al., 2004). In contrast, individuals appear better at estimating future memory performance 
when they make a series of estimates in a within-subject manner (i.e. each individual makes 
two or more estimates concerning future memory performance; Koriat et al., 2004). 
Embedding a deception in actual past memory does not transform the liars’ task from being a 
between-subject estimate, to being a within-subject estimate. That is, even when embedding 
lies, liars must make a single estimate regarding memory performance. As such, the stability 
bias may generalise to settings that allow for embedded deceptions (Leins et al., 2013; Vrij, 
2008), even when liars utilize real memory derived from an actual delay, and thus employ 
experience-based cues.  
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Therefore, Experiment 2 extended Experiment 1 by examining a scenario where liars 
experience an actual delay, rather than mentally simulating the effects of delay. In 
Experiment 2 we explored whether the effects observed in Experiment 1 (where liars were 
forced to apply theory-based cues) generalise to instances where liars can apply experience-
based cues. We predict truth tellers will display forgetting across delay and liars to display a 
stability bias (Hypothesis 3). We further predict the difference in providing detail between 
truth tellers and liars will be more pronounced in the immediate condition than in the delay 
interval condition. As a consequence, we predict deception detection accuracy to be greater in 
the immediate interviewing condition compared to the delay interval condition (Hypothesis 
4).  
Experiment 2  
Method 
Design  
 A 2 (Veracity: Truth teller vs. Liar) x 2 (Interview Time: Immediate vs. Delay) between 
subject design was used with overall details (the sum total of spatial, temporal and perceptual 
detail combined) as the dependent measure.  
Ethics   
 A favorable ethical review decision was given, prior to the research, by the Science 
Faculty Ethics Committee (SFEC) (reference SFEC 2015-059), University of Portsmouth, 
UK.  All participants’ rights where protected during the study.    
Participants  
 A total of 100 volunteers, comprising of 68 females and 32 males, aged between 18 and 
55 years (M = 24.09 years, SD = 8.51, 95% CI [22.46, 25.70]), from the University’s 
undergraduate, postgraduate, and staff communities, participated in the experiment.  
Procedure  
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 Participants were recruited via adverts on the University’s online participant pool and 
were informed that the experiment was about detecting deception within an intelligence 
setting. Participants were tested individually. 
 Upon obtaining informed consent, all participants were randomly allocated to either the 
truth teller (n = 50) or liar (n = 50) Veracity conditions. Half of the participants per group 
where then randomly allocated to either the delay (n = 50) or the no delay (n = 50) condition, 
resulting in 25 participants per cell.   
 All participants were told the experiment involved assuming the role of an intelligence 
operative with access to a ‘classified video recording’ of an intelligence briefing. This 
recording (video) has been used in previous research (Ewens et. al., 2014, 2015; Shaw et. al, 
2013). The video is ostensibly about intelligence operatives who are planning to plant a 
surveillance device. All participants were told they should try and remember as many details 
about the briefing video as possible. Additionally, it was explained i) that note taking was 
prohibited and ii) that the briefing video could only be observed once. All participants were 
told they would be interviewed later about the briefing video.  
 Truth tellers (n = 50) were told that for the experiment they are an intelligence 
operative for the ‘Blue’ team and will be interviewed by a member of their own team. As 
such, they should be totally truthful to the interviewer and provide them with as much 
information as they can recall. 
 Liars (n = 50) were told that for the experiment they were an intelligence operative for 
the ‘Red’ team but would be interviewed by a member of the opposing ‘Blue’ team and as 
such their task was to mislead the interviewer about certain information in the video, 
including (i) what the surveillance device looked like, (ii) its functions and, also (iii) the 
location that was chosen to plant the device. Liars were told that the interviewer knew that 
the device would be placed somewhere, but did not know where. They were instructed that 
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they should not reveal the location that was selected to hide the surveillance device and their 
objective was to mislead the investigator by using the third location mentioned in the video as 
the location that was selected to plant the device. In reality, the surveillance device was 
hidden in a different location. Liars were also told to lie about the device itself. They were 
informed the interviewer knew something about the device but did not have all the details, 
and that it was not clear exactly what the interviewer knew. Because of this, liars were told to 
provide some truthful and some false information about the spy device, as this would help 
them appear truthful without having to tell the interviewer everything.  
 All participants were told that if the interviewer judged them as truthful, they would 
receive £10 (in the immediate condition) or £15 (in the delay condition). Participants in the 
delayed interviewing condition received greater compensation than participants in the 
immediate condition as they were required to attend two test sessions. Participants were 
informed that if they were rated as truthful by the interviewer they would be entered into a 
prize draw to win up to £150 in prize money. Participants were also informed that if they did 
not appear truthful, they would instead be asked to write a statement about what happened 
during the study. We used the possibility of a monetary reward and time-consuming written 
statement as additional incentives to motivate participants to convince the interviewer of their 
honesty. In reality, in addition to the standard compensation (£10 for the immediate and £15 
for the delayed interviewing condition), all participants (irrespective of condition or 
performance in the interview) were entered into the prize draw (and none were required to 
write a statement).  Three winners of the prize draw were randomly selected and awarded 
£150, £75 and £50. 
 All participants watched the video on a laptop. After the video, participants in the delay 
condition where told that they completed the first phase of the study. Contact details were 
taken (email address and mobile phone number), and dates and times where confirmed for the 
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individuals to return after three-weeks. All participants in the delay condition returned for the 
second phase of the study. Upon their return three-weeks later, participants in the delay 
condition progressed to the second phase of the study. Participants in the immediate 
condition progressed immediately into the second phase of the study.   
 The experimenter began the second phase of the experiment by informing the 
participant that they would be questioned about the video.  All participants were permitted as 
much preparation time as they required. After indicating they were prepared for the 
interview, all participants completed the pre-interview questionnaire. The participants were 
asked for their demographic information (age, gender, occupation) and to rate their 
preparation for the interview on 7-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (very poor) to 7 (very 
good). Upon completion, participants were interviewed.  
The interview  
 The same interviewer was used throughout the experiment and all interviews were 
audio and video recorded. The interviewer was blind to the experimental condition of the 
interviewees, and was blind to the content of the video. The interview protocol was identical 
for all participants and comprised three questions. Interviewee’s were asked to describe in as 
much detail as possible: (1) what the surveillance device in the video looked like; (2) 
everything they could remember about what the surveillance device could do (i.e. what its 
functions where); and (3) as much information as possible about where the device is going to 
be planted. 
 After the interview, participants were given a post-interview questionnaire to complete. 
In this questionnaire, participants were asked to rate their motivation for performing well 
during the interview (on a 7-point Likert Scale, ranging from 1 extremely unmotivated to 7 
extremely motivated), and to report percentage of truthful information they disclosed in the 
interview (also on an 11-point Likert Scale, ranging from 0% to 100%)). Upon completion 
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participants where thanked, debriefed and compensated for their time. 
Coding  
 The coding procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. A second coder (also blind to 
the veracity of the statements) coded a random selection of 20 statements (20%) for all the 
dependent measures. Inter-rater reliabilities between the two coders for the occurrence 
frequency of perceptual, spatial and temporal detail were measured via intra-class correlation 
coefficients (ICC). The ICC was high and therefore satisfactory for total spatial details [ICC] 
= .85, temporal details [ICC] = .87, perceptual details [ICC] = .92 and total details [spatial, 
temporal and perceptual information combined ICC] = .93. The three sub-categories of detail 
were introduced to facilitate (inter-rater) reliability coding. Since no hypothesis was 
formulated about this, we just report the total detail results in this article.  
Results  
Manipulation Check  
 Veracity  
 Truth tellers rated their statements (M = 85.20%, SD = 9.95, 95% CI [82.64, 87.84]) as 
significantly more truthful than liars rated their statements (M = 24.00%, SD = 11.78, 95% CI 
[20.77, 27.66]), t(98)= 28.068, p< 0.001, d = 5.61, 95% CI [4.67, 6.39].  
Motivation 
 Overall, participants reported being highly motivated (M = 6.44, SD = 0.62, 95% CI 
[6.31, 6.57]) to perform well in the experiment. No main effect for Veracity, F(1,96)= .101, 
p= .751 or Interview Time F(1,96)= 1.620, p= .206 emerged, and the Veracity X Interview 
Time interaction was not significant either, F(1,96) = .101, p= .751.  
Hypothesis testing  
 A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interview Time) analysis of variance (ANOVA) using overall 
reported detail as the dependent variable revealed a main effect for Veracity, F(1,96)= 5.464, 
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MSE = 4678.56, p = .021. A significant main effect for Interview Time also emerged, 
F(1,96)= 3.431, MSE = 2937.64, p = .034. Furthermore, the Interview Time X Veracity 
interaction was significant, F(1,96)= 4.577, MSE = 3918.76, p= 0.035, ηp2
 = .05.   
 Truth tellers in the Immediate condition (M = 69.48, SD = 41.88, 95% CI [53.80, 
87.00]) reported more details than truth tellers in the Delay condition (M = 46.12, SD = 
30.54, 95% CI [35.72, 59.00]), t(34.099) = 2.831,  p = 0.004, d = 0.64, 95% CI [.06, 1.20]. In 
contrast, liars in the Immediate condition (M = 43.28, SD = 19.67, 95% CI [36.88, 51.69]) 
and liars in the Delay condition (M = 44.96, SD = 18.75, 95% CI [37.96, 52.14]) did not 
differ significantly in terms of the number of details reported, t(48) = .162, p= 0.872, d = 
0.09, 95% CI [-.47, .64].  This interaction effect supports Hypothesis 3. 
Classification  
 We ran two discriminate analyses to distinguish between honest and deceptive 
participants in the i) Immediate and ii) Delay interview conditions separately. In both cases, 
the objective Veracity group belonging (truth tellers or liar) was the classifying variable and 
overall reported detail was the predictor. We present the cross-validated ‘leave-one-out’ 
results. As Table 3 shows, a significant discriminant function emerged for distinguishing 
between truth tellers and liars in the immediate interviewing condition, χ2(1) = 7.336, Wilks’ 
λ = .857, p =0.007, (canonical correlation was .38). This function correctly classified 88.0% 
of liars and 44.0% of truth tellers, resulting in an overall accuracy rate of 66.0%. The 
discriminate analysis distinguishing between liars and truth tellers in the delay condition was 
not significant, χ2(1) = 0.026, Wilks’ λ = 0.999, p= 0.872, (canonical correlation was .02). 
This supports Hypothesis 4. 
 
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
Discussion 
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 Study 2 revealed a similar pattern of findings to Study 1. Truth tellers in the immediate 
interviewing condition reported more details overall than truth tellers in the delay 
interviewing condition, whereas the number of details reported by liars did not vary as a 
function of delay interval (supporting Hypothesis 3). Thus, liars in Experiment 2 displayed a 
similar stability bias as observed in Experiment 1. This was the case despite liars utilizing 
real memory derived from an actual delay. As such, the difference between liars and truth 
tellers in terms of overall detail found in the immediate condition (and often reported in 
deception literature) collapsed in the delay condition. This resulted in superior deception 
detection performance (see table 4) using overall detail in the immediate (cf. delay) 
interviewing condition (supporting Hypothesis 4).  
General Discussion  
 In two experiments we explored the effect on liars and truth tellers of providing 
statements with or without a 3-week delay interval. In Experiment 1 liars displayed a stability 
bias when incorporating a simulated (i.e. unexperienced) delay into their fabricated scripts 
and Experiment 2 liars displayed the same bias when incorporating actual (i.e. experienced) 
delay into their statements derived from memory. The quantity of overall details reported by 
liars did not vary as a function of interview time in either Experiment 1 or 2. The stability 
bias appears to affect liars when both generating outright fabrications (lies derived from 
mental simulations of experiences; Experiment 1) and when telling embedding lies (lies 
derived from genuinely experienced events; Experiment 2). In the case of embedded lies, this 
stability bias occurs despite the actual memory presumably providing liars with some index 
of how memory strength fades across time. However, neither the necessary application of 
theory-based cues (Experiment 1) nor the availability of memory derived from experience 
(and presumably, experienced-based cues of realistic memory strength; Experiment 2) 
allowed liars to accurately calibrate for the effects of forgetting across time. This is a 
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theoretically novel finding and suggests the presence of an interesting metacognitive error 
within the accounts of liars (e.g. Vrij et al., 2009).  
 To explore the possibility that liars display a stability bias for overall detail but not for 
specific detail categories, we reanalysed the data examining spatial, temporal and perceptual 
details individually for both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. The pattern of results for liars 
were similar across both experiments as obtained for overall detail. In Experiment 1, liars 
reported more spatial detail in the delay condition (versus the immediate condition), with the 
quantity of temporal and spatial detail not varying as a function of interview time. Truth 
tellers reported less spatial, temporal and perceptual detail in the delay condition than in the 
immediate condition. In Experiment 2, liars again reported more spatial detail in the delay 
condition (versus the immediate condition), while the quantity of temporal and spatial detail 
not varying as a function of interview time. Truth tellers reported less spatial detail in the 
delay versus the immediate condition. Truth tellers reported less perceptual and temporal 
detail in the delay versus immediate condition, although these trends did not research 
significance (full analyses are available from the first author). Thus, the observed stability bias 
for liars in terms of overall quantity of reported detail appears to generalise to spatial, 
temporal and perceptual details categories individually.  
 There are (at least) two explanations for the stability bias amongst liars in respect to 
reported details. Liars may be (i) cognitively unable (e.g. Koriat et al., 2004) or (ii) 
strategically unwilling (e.g. Köhnken, 1989, 1996, 2004) to simulate the effects of forgetting 
across retention interval. Liars may be unable to correctly estimate the degree to which 
memory retrieval failures occur, and how memory changes (i.e. decays) across time (e.g. 
Koriat et al., 2004), due to implicit biases and false beliefs regarding memory performance 
(Loftus et al., 1980; Ost et al., 2016; Simons et al., 2011). Thus, liars may believe 
stereotypical truth tellers to have vivid memories of past events. Liars may also be 
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strategically unwilling to leave out too many details due to concerns that disclosing 
statements bereft of detail jeopardises their credibility (e.g. Köhnken, 1989, 1996, 2004).  
Future research should isolate the boundary conditions and underlying mechanism 
responsible for the stability bias amongst liars. One potential means of doing so is to examine 
the robustness of the stability bias effect to counter-measures (e.g. informing interviewees 
about the stability bias). For example, Koriat et al. (2004; Expt. 7) found that framing time 
intervals explicitly in terms of forgetting (i.e. asking individuals to estimate how many word-
pairs will be forgotten) was effective at eliciting more accurate estimates of retention rates 
over time. As such, if counter-measure information was framed in terms of forgetting (e.g. 
‘consider carefully how much a truth teller would forget from time A to time B’), liars may 
no longer display the stability bias if such a bias is underpinned by a cognitive difficulty in 
accurately calibrating the appropriate level of detail to report. If true, the empirical question 
becomes if liars would then over, under, or accurately estimate the appropriate level of detail 
to disclose. However, if liars are driven by a strategic unwillingness to leave out too many 
details, then counter-measures instruction framed in such a manner may have minimal effect.  
 It is possible that liars may be able to calibrate their reports to take into account the 
effect of delay, but not with respect to detail measured using Reality Monitoring criteria. 
Although future research should explore this possibility, the current findings with respect to 
Reality Monitoring measured detail have clear theoretical and practical implications for 
verbal lie detection. The quantity of reported detail is typically a reliable cue to credibility 
(Amado et al., 2016; DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008), with liars reporting fewer details than 
truth tellers (for theoretical explanations of this finding, see Vrij, 2008; Köhnken, 1989, 
1996, 2004; Masip & Herrero, 2013; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014). Reality Monitoring detail 
criterion definitions are extensively employed within the lie detection literature (e.g. Colwell 
et al., 2013; Nahari, Vrij & Fisher, 2014; Lancaster et al., 2014). The finding that in our 
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experiments after delays, detail (as operationalized using Reality Monitoring criteria) did not 
distinguish liars from truth tellers is relevant for the wider verbal deception literature, as it 
suggests that accurate verbal lie detection after a delay is difficult. However, this finding 
should be interpreted within the experimental contexts. The lack of differences between truth 
tellers and liars in the delayed interviewing condition could be attenuated by the nature of the 
experimental task. For example, the scenario experienced by the truth tellers in both 
experiment 1 and 2 where of a short duration and of no personal significance to them (outside 
the experimental scenario). Plausibly, different findings will emerge when truth tellers 
discuss rich event in the past that had genuine importance to them. For example, when truth 
tellers and liars discussed a holiday trip they made in the past year, the statements of truth 
tellers were more detailed than the statements of liars who made up a story about such a trip 
(Vrij et al., 2016). However, the general principle that the completeness of recalls 
systematically decreases as the delay between witnessing an event and recall increases also 
applies to such richer and more important events. 
 The finding that liars display a metacognitive error (a stability bias) when lying after a 
delay may itself present a tactical opportunity and could be theoretically exploited by 
proactive interview protocols. The use of interview protocols that facilitate enhanced retrieval 
after delay intervals may elicit additional detail from truth tellers. Liars may be unable to take 
into account their effect on genuine recall. Accordingly, such manipulations may elicit verbal 
cues to deception after delay intervals, with liars being less detailed than truth tellers. The use 
of interview protocols that encourage interviewees to say more may also elicit verbal cues to 
deceit but in the opposite way: Due to the stability bias liars may be tempted to provide more 
additional detail than truth tellers, which would make liars more detailed than truth tellers. 
Further research should explore these two possibilities.  
 There is one feature of the design that warrants further discussion. We changed both the 
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setting of the liars’ task (i.e. from insurance settings in Experiment 1 to intelligence settings 
in Experiment 2) as well as the nature of the liars’ task (i.e. from a hypothetical delay interval 
in Experiment 1 to an actual delay interval in Experiment 2). Our motivation for varying the 
nature of the liars’ task (from a simulated delay in Experiment 1 to an actual delay in 
Experiment 2) was to examine the boundary conditions of the stability bias for liars. Our 
motivation for varying the setting of the liars’ task (from an insurance setting in Experiment 1 
to an intelligence setting for Experiment 2) was to examine the generalisability of the 
stability bias to different deception settings. Previous research has highlighted that different 
contexts afford different challenges to lie detectors and opportunities to liars. Although the 
principle objective of our experiments was not to show that the stability bias is entirely 
unaffected by the forensic setting, future research should explore this possibility.  
Conclusion 
 Interviews with suspects often occur with at least some delay interval between the 
target incident and the interview taking place. Understanding how verbal cues to deception 
vary as a function of retention interval is of practical importance to the deception and 
investigative interviewing literature. Across two experiments we investigated how the 
quantity of information reported by liars and truth tellers varied as a function of delay interval 
between the supposed event and the interview. In both experiments, liars displayed a stability 
bias with respect to the overall detail reported whereas truth tell tellers in both studies 
reported fewer details in the delay versus immediate conditions. Consequently, accurate 
discrimination between liars and truth tellers was only possible across both experiments in 
the immediate condition. Critically, liars are susceptible to committing a metacognitive error 
when lying after extended retention intervals.  This stability bias appears to be robust and 
applies irrespective of whether liars incorporate retention interval into their statements via 
outright fabrication (i.e. simulation employing theory-based cues) or use actual memory (i.e. 
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embedding using available experience-based cues) from the past.   
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Appendix 1 (Experiment 1 Liar materials)  
‘You have been asked to convince the interviewer you are telling the truth and experienced a 
loss of a tablet device [earlier today/ 3-weeks ago]. To help you do this, review the materials 
below that provide detail about the truth teller’s task (who did experience a loss of a tablet 
device [earlier today/ three-weeks ago]). As you have been instructed, you should use these 
details as your own and pretend the events described below occurred to you. Take as much 
time as you require to prepare yourself.’ 
 
Description of the Truth Tellers Task 
The following events occurred to the truth telling participants [earlier today/ three weeks 
ago]. After signing informed consent, the experimenter explains to the Truth teller (the 
participant) that the study will be conducted in a local bar (The Fleet). The truth teller follows 
the experimenter to Technicians Office (on the second floor of the Department) where they 
sign for and collect the iPad and a charging cable from a member of the technical support 
staff, with the testing application pre-loaded onto it.  
 
Participants were then escorted by the experimenter to the local bar where they were 
intercepted by a female PhD student. The PhD student explained that she required assistance 
from the experimenter regarding a manuscript she is preparing for their supervisor. The 
experimenter explained that he was running a study but suggested the confederate to join him 
and the participant to the bar. Once inside, the participant, researcher and confederate sat 
down at a round table from which it was not possible to see the bar. The participant was 
handed the tablet device and instructed to open an application (for the study). The tablet 
device was not charged and so the participant found that they were not able to open the 
application due to low battery levels. The researcher then suggested taking it to the bar and 
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asking the bar staff if it could be charged. The participant accompanied the experimenter to 
the bar and the bar staff accepted the device, taking it to be ‘charged’.  
 
The experimenter offers the participant a (non-alcoholic) drink of their choice (he buys one 
for the confederate and himself regardless) and pays. Taking the drinks back to the table, the 
researcher then read the confederate’s manuscript, whist the participant and confederate 
played three rounds of a popular game (ConnectFour). After 15 minutes, the participant and 
the experimenter returned to collect the device, to be told it had already been taken by 
someone the staff assumed was a member of the research team. The experimenter asks the 
confederate and the participant if they had seen anything (nobody could have given the 
position of the table in relation to the bar). The experimenter then said that they should return 
to the department to be interviewed about what happened.  
 
Delay condition only  
The experimenter tells the participant they will be interviewed about the loss of the tablet 
when interviewing facilities become available. Because all interviewers and rooms are 
currently being used, the participant arranges with the experimenter to return in three-weeks 
to be interviewed at the Department.  Hence, you should pretend the events described above 
occurred three-weeks ago.   
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Immediate condition only  
The experimenter tells the participant they will be interviewed about the loss of the tablet 
when interviewing facilities become available. Because interviewers and interviewing rooms 
are currently available, the truth teller arranges with the experimenter to be interviewed at the 
Department immediately. Hence, you should pretend the events described above occurred 
earlier today.   
 
 ‘To further aid you describe the event from the truth teller’s perspective (and provide 
suitable detail), please study photos of the location of the events described above and the map 
showing the route taken by participants from the Psychology Department (your current 
location) there. You should use this information to provide suitable detail but you may 
provide additional detail (of your choice) if you wish.’  
 
‘Based upon all the information provided, please prepare yourself for the interview. You have 
been asked to convince the interviewer you are telling the truth and experienced a loss of a 
tablet device [earlier today/ 3-weeks ago]. Please ask the experimenter if you have any 
questions and take as much time as you require to prepare yourself.’ 
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Table 1 
Self-report memory scores as a function of Interview Time as a function of interview condition in Study 1 
 Immediate interviewing condition  Delayed interviewing condition      
 M  SD 95% CI  M SD 95% CI t df p Cohen’s d 95% CI 
Truth teller’s memory strength             
Memory strength 
Memory detail 
Memory clarity 
5.95 
5.80 
5.75 
1.10 
1.01 
1.21 
5.44, 6.39 
5.31, 6.21 
5.21, 6.26 
 3.95 
3.75 
3.70 
1.28 
1.25 
1.22 
3.43, 4.53 
3.25, 4.27 
3.17, 4.24 
5.310 
5.712 
5.343 
38 
38 
38 
p<0.001 
p<0.001 
p<0.001 
1.68 
1.80 
1.69 
.93, 2.36 
1.04, 2.50 
.94, 2.37 
Liars’ script strength             
Memory strength 
Memory detail 
Memory clarity 
5.80 
5.95 
5.60 
1.15 
0.94 
1.14 
5.26, 6.26 
5.55, 6.32 
5.08, 6.07 
 4.85 
4.45 
4.60 
0.88 
1.15 
1.05 
4.42, 5.20 
3.89, 4.92 
4.12, 5.05 
2.937 
4.517 
2.887 
38 
38 
38 
p=0.006 
p<0.001 
p=0.006 
0.93 
1.43 
0.91 
.26, 1.56 
.71, 2.09 
.24, 1.54 
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Table 2 
Classification Rates for Overall Detail as a Function of Interview Time in the Hypothetical Delay Scenario (Study 1) 
 Immediate   Three-week Delay 
 Truth Teller 
(%) 
Liar 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
 Truth Teller  
(%) 
Liar 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Overall Detail 
Hit rate 
 
65.0 
 
80.0 
 
72.5 
  
75.0 
 
45.0 
 
60.0 
Note. Accuracy rates from significant discriminate functions appear in bold.  
 
Table 3 
Classification Rates for Overall Detail as a function of Interview Time in the Real Delay Scenario (Study 2) 
 Immediate   Three-week Delay 
 Truth Teller 
(%) 
Liar 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
 Truth Teller  
(%) 
Liar 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Overall Detail 
Hit rate 
 
44.0 
 
88.0 
 
66.0 
  
8.0 
 
56.0 
 
44.0 
Note. Accuracy rates from significant discriminate functions appear in bold.  
 
